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Abstract
This paper describes the modelling of a two multicast group key management protocols
in a first-order inductive model, and the discovery of previously unknown attacks on them
by the automated inductive counterexample finder CORAL. These kinds of protocols had
not been analysed in a scenario with an active intruder before. CORAL proved to be a
suitable tool for a job because, unlike most automated tools for discovering attacks, it deals
directly with an open-ended model where the number of agents and the roles they play
are unbounded. Additionally, CORAL’s model allows us to reason explicitly about lists of
terms in a message, which proved to be essential for modelling the second protocol. In
the course of the case studies, we also discuss other issues surrounding multicast protocol
analysis, including identifying the goals of the protocol with respect to the intended trust
model, modelling of the control conditions, which are considerably more complex than for
standard two and three party protocols, and effective searching of the state space generated
by the model, which has a much larger branching rate than for standard protocols.
Key words: Security protocol analysis, group multicast key
management
1 Introduction
In terms of analysing the standard corpus of two and three party protocols given
in [7], the field of cryptographic security protocol analysis can be said to be satu-
rated. Much research attention has now turned to trying to widen the scope of the
techniques, e.g. to group protocols, [14,27,24]. The term ‘group protocol’ refers
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to a protocol (or suite of sub-protocols) for establishing a secure key between an
unbounded number of agents. This may take the form of a single key-establishment
run between the agents, or a series of requests to join and leave a group with asso-
ciated key updates. Some protocols involve a trusted key server. Significant attacks
on group protocols have appeared in the literature, but these have been discovered
by patient pen and paper analysis, [22]. Attempts to extend automatic tools to anal-
yse such protocols have had mixed results (see §2). Taghdiri and Jackson, [27],
published an analysis of a protocol for group multicast key management proposed
by Tanaka and Sato, [28]. They were able to find major flaws and proposed a
new, improved version of the protocol. However, their model was rather weak: in
particular, it did not include an active attacker. In this paper, we investigate their
improved protocol using CORAL, [24], and show how it discovered two new at-
tacks just as serious as the original ones. Additionally we look at the Iolus key
management protocol, [18], which was analysed in Taghdiri’s MSc thesis, [26],
and thought to be secure. Again CORAL was able to find an attack.
To carry out the analysis, CORAL’s model had to be developed to include state
information not always included in the trace of messages exchanged, such as the
current group key held by the key server, and the current time, expressed as the
number of events that have taken place in the trace so far. The reasons for this will
be made clear in the description of the case studies below.
In successfully modelling and attacking these protocols, we have given further
evidence for the utility of the CORAL approach; though run times are typically slow,
we can very quickly adapt the Horn-clause model to new kinds of protocol. Addi-
tionally, the attacks discovered are significantly longer than those typically found
in the Clark-Jacob corpus, [7], and those found by CORAL before, [24]. To achieve
really fast attack discovery times on these protocols, it should be possible to adapt
purpose built protocol analysis tools, though significant work may be required. We
examine this possibility in §5.
The paper is organised as follows: in §2, we review previous work on group
protocol analysis. In §3 we describe the first case study, on Taghdiri and Jackson’s
improved version of the Tanaka-Sato protocol. The second case study, on the Iolus
protocol, follows in §4. Throughout the case studies, we highlight some general
issues about the modelling of multicast protocols. These points are summarised in
§5, where we discuss the lessons learned and the problems that remain to be solved.
§6 contains conclusions and plans for further work.
2 Background
The field of cryptographic security protocol analysis is now far too large to cover
here. A recent survey can be found in [15]. In this section, we will briefly survey
previous work specific to group protocol analysis.
Perhaps the first formal analysis of a group protocol was by Paulson. He in-
vestigated a recursive authentication protocol proposed by Bull and Otway, [6], as
part of his development of the inductive method, [21]. Paulson was able to model
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it in the general case, i.e. for any number of participants, and prove some security
properties for arbitrarily-sized groups. Paulson’s method uses a typed higher-order
logic formalism, and poses security properties as conjectures about properties of
the trace. These properties are then proved by induction on traces in the interactive
theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. However, if there is a flaw in the protocol, Paulson’s
method provides no automated support for finding the attack.
CORAL, [24], has been used to discover attacks on the Asokan–Ginzboorg pro-
tocol for key establishment in an ad-hoc wireless network, [2]. CORAL uses a first-
order version of Paulson’s protocol model, and searches for counterexamples to the
security property under consideration, i.e. it searches for attacks when the protocol
is flawed. Inference is carried out by an adapted version of the first-order theorem
prover SPASS, [29], using the refutation complete ‘proof by consistency’ strategy,
[8]. CORAL searches the infinite model of the system directly, with no parameteri-
sation with respect to sessions, roles, size of the group etc. In addition to standard
subsumption and tautology checking, a small set of domain-specific reduction rules
are used to prune the search space. The use of an inductive model allowed the spec-
ification of the Asokan–Ginzboorg protocol for a group of unbounded size, which
lead to the discovery of distinct attacks on groups of size two and then three while
investigating the same security property.
Several significant attacks on the CLIQUES protocol suite, [3], were found
by Pereira and Quisquater as a result of a programme of manual analysis, [22].
The CLIQUES protocol suite contains a number of protocols for establishment
of groups, and groups within groups, each with their own secure key. Extensive
use is made of Diffie-Hellman style exponentiation, [10]. Pereira and Quisquater
proposed a method for converting the problem of the intruder obtaining a partic-
ular term to the solution of a system of linear equations. Using this method, they
were able to find weaknesses in every protocol they examined. Often, the attacks
involved quite imaginative behaviour by the intruder, e.g. being accepted as a mem-
ber of a group of size 4, and then using the values learnt in that key establishment
session to force a group of size 3, intended to exclude him, to use a key that he
knows. One clear lesson from Pereira and Quisquater’s work is that the design of
these kinds of protocols is extremely tricky. It is easy to understand how the de-
signers of the CLIQUES protocols failed to see such attacks. This strengthens the
case for the use of formal methods in their design.
Meadows used the NRL protocol analyser (NPA) to tackle the Group Domain
of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol suite, as part of an effort to introduce formal
methods to the design stage of protocol development, [16]. GDOI is a method for
group key management involving a trusted key server. NPA could not handle the
infinite data structures required for a general model of the protocol, so a concrete
abstraction of the protocol was made, restricting phase two to the distribution of
one ‘security association key’. NPA was able to find a type flaw in the protocol,
which was fixed in later versions of GDOI. However, Meadows’ attempt to use
NPA to rediscover the Pereira-Quisquater attacks on the CLIQUES suite was less
successful, [14]. NPA was extended to handle the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation
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operation, but could not find the attacks described in [22].
The designers of the protocol specification language CAPSL, [9], have recently
turned their attention to group protocols in the development of an extended lan-
guage, MuCAPSL, [17]. After translating the GDH.2 protocol, [25], to their inter-
mediate language MuCIL they were able to discover a type flaw. However, their
analysis requires the number of group members to be set in advance, which can
prejudice the chances of discovering an attack. The designers of the HLSPL pro-
tocol language, [23], have also been working on extending their coverage to group
protocols, though no results of this work were available at the time of writing this
paper.
Taghdiri and Jackson, [27], reported results from the modelling of a multicast
key management scheme proposed by Tanaka and Sato, [28]. This protocol was
designed for a scenario where the group is highly dynamic, i.e. agents join and
leave the group frequently. The idea was to minimise the number of key updates
required by supplying keys to agents on demand. Taghdiri and Jackson formalised
a model for the protocol in the Alloy specification language, [12], and used Alloy’s
SAT checker to search for counterexamples to desirable properties of the protocol.
Several counterexamples were found, the most serious one indicating that current
members of the group will accept as valid messages broadcast by ex-members of
the group. Taghdiri and Jackson proposed an improved protocol. However, their
formal protocol model differed from the norm established over the last 25 years
in that no active attacker was included. In the rest of this paper, we explain how
we modelled and analysed both Taghdiri and Jackson’s improved protocol, and the
Iolus key management protocol treated in Taghdiri’s MSc thesis (and considered
to be secure), [26], using our inductive counterexample discovery tool, CORAL.
We discovered that neither of these protocols are secure in the presence of an ac-
tive attacker, even if he is weaker than the Dolev-Yao intruder generally used in
automated protocol analysis, [11].
3 The Tanaka–Sato/Taghdiri–Jackson Protocol
The protocol that Tanaka and Sato originally proposed, [28], was primarily con-
cerned with minimising the burden of key updates in terms of network traffic and
processor time. Two main design features were introduced for this purpose: the
first was the division of the group into subgroups, each under the management of a
key distribution server (KDS). The communication between the KDSs is assumed
to be not only secure but also conducted under a reliable totally ordered multicast
protocol (RTOMP). Taghdiri and Jackson, [27], modelled this by assuming that as
soon as one KDS updates its key, all the other KDSs instantaneously update theirs,
effectively reducing the model to a single server. In our model, we also restrict
attention to a single server. The second design feature of the protocol is that agents
retain a list of keys rather than just one key. They discard an old key as invalid t
units of time after having received a more up-to-date key, where t is set with respect
to the delay in the network. Keys are distributed only when an agent sends a request
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to the server. An agent will make such a request when he wants to send a multicast
message, or if he receives a message encrypted under a key he doesn’t know. In
both cases, he will send a message to the server giving the ID number of the newest
key he has, and the server will send back all newer keys. Only the newest key is
used for multicast broadcasting.
This retention of a list of keys was shown in Taghdiri and Jackson’s analysis
to lead to major security problems. The most serious attack involved members of
the group accepting messages from a principal outside the group. A member of
the group A can simply broadcast a message from inside the group, leave, and then
broadcast a message using the same key. Though the group key has been updated
as a result of A leaving, the other agents in the group will still accept the second
message as valid as they all have the old key. To counter this, Taghdiri and Jackson
suggested changes to the protocol. Each agent should retain only the most recent
key he has received, and upon receiving a multicast message, should contact the
server to confirm that it is encrypted under the newest key. This may result in
some message loss, because delays in the network might mean that by the time a
multicast message has been received and a key request sent to the server, the group
key has changed, but this was reckoned to be acceptable compared to the potential
security breach.
It is the improved version of the protocol we have modelled and analysed us-
ing CORAL. In doing so we were aiming to address one major oversight of the
Taghdiri–Jackson analysis, namely the lack of an active intruder in their model. An
active intruder of some kind has been assumed since the very first security protocol
paper, [20]. His behaviour was formalised by Dolev and Yao, [11], and since then it
has generally been accepted that the spy should also be able to pose as a legitimate
agent, as for example in Lowe’s famous attack, [13]. If anything, compared to a
unicast protocol, it would seem even more likely that a multicast protocol would
be subject to attack by an active intruder, as argued in [18]. There are inherently
more opportunities for interception of traffic, and the ‘crowd’ of principals would
typically make it easier for an intruder to pose as another legitimate principal. Such
protocols should therefore be subjected to analysis under the full Dolev-Yao at-
tacker model, as is standard for unicast protocols.
The Tanaka-Sato protocol assumes the existence of a unicast authentication pro-
tocol that allows the server to establish an individual key (IK) with a new member
joining the group. This IK is used to encrypt all communication between that mem-
ber and the server. We model the underlying authentication protocol by assuming
the existence of a long-term key shared by each valid potential member of the group
with the KDS. Since we are looking for attacks on the protocol rather than trying to
verify it, we can easily justify this. We can simply take the attacks we discover and
examine them to see if the specific way we implemented the authentication phase
was exploited. The attacks described in this paper would be effective for any initial
authentication protocol. Additionally, we make the standard assumption that the
spy has access to a valid long-term key.
Here is a description of the improved version of the protocol as described by
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Taghdiri and Jackson, and as modelled in this paper:
Joining the Group
1. Mi → S : {| join }| KMi
2. S → Mi : {| IkMi, Gk(n)}| KMi
In message 1, Mi wants to join the group, so sends a join request under his long-
term key KMi . The server generates a fresh individual key , IkM i, and a new group
key Gk(n). Each group key has a unique ID number (n). The new individual key
and group key are sent to the joining member in message 2.
Leaving the Group
1. Mi → S : {| leave }| IkMi
2. S → Mi : {| ack.leave }| IkMi
In message 1, Mi sends a request to leave encrypted under his individual key Ik.
The server acknowledges the leave in message 2, and generates a new group key.
The new group key is not distributed yet though. In fact, if another membership
change occurs before a request for a key is received, it will never be distributed.
Sending a message
1. Mi → S : {| send, n}| IkMi
2. S → Mi : {| n′, Gk(n′)}| IkMi
3. Mi → ALL : {| message }| Gk(n′)
In message 1, agent Mi signals to the server that he would like to send a message
by sending what the protocol designers call a ‘sequence request’ message together
with the ID number of the newest key he has, n. The server checks that Mi is in
the group, and then sends back the newest key Gk(n′). If no joins or leaves have
occurred since Mi last received a key, it may be that n = n′, but this will not be the
case in general. In message 3, agent Mi broadcasts his message to the group.
Receiving a message
1. Mj → S : {| read, n}| IkMj
2. S → Mj : {| Gk(n′)}| IkMj
Suppose a multicast message has been broadcast, as in message 3 of the ‘sending
a message’ fragment above. When another agent Mj receives the message, he first
sends a request to the server for the newest key. He then receives the newest key
Gk(n′), and will only accept the multicast message if it was encrypted under that
key.
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Commentary
The revised protocol as proposed by Taghdiri and Jackson contains some redun-
dancy as a result of their security improvements. For example, there is no reason
for the server to send the key to a new member when he joins, since he is required
to ask for a key update whenever he sends or receives a multicast message. Addi-
tionally, the sequence number sent in the request for a key update before sending a
message also seems redundant. Previously, the server would have used it to decide
which keys to send back, but in the revised version, the server only ever sends back
the most recent key. It would be better to replace this with a nonce, as we argue
after presenting the attacks we discovered, in §3.2.
3.1 Modelling in CORAL
CORAL’s model is a first-order version of Paulson’s inductive model, [21]. We
enforce strong typing on message elements by using a sorted signature, with unary
functions acting as sort constraints. A protocol is modelled as the set of all possible
traces, i.e. all possible sequences of messages sent by any number of honest users
under the specification of the protocol and, additionally, faked messages sent by the
intruder. A trace of messages is modelled as a list. Horn clauses define how a valid
trace may be extended by honest agents as specified by the protocol. Further clauses
model the knowledge the intruder can learn from previous messages in the trace,
using the same synth and analz operators that Paulson uses. To search for attacks,
we pose conjectures about security properties exactly as Paulson does. CORAL
then searches for counterexamples, effectively by a backwards search, i.e. it goes
from a state violating the security property backwards to see if there is a valid trace
reaching that state. More details of our model and the operation of CORAL are
available in [24].
A feature of our model was that all the information about the state of the system,
i.e. the state and knowledge of all the principals involved, was stored in the trace
and inferred from the trace each time it was needed. First-order rules can then
be used to add an arbitrary number of messages to the trace in a single instant.
This was particularly useful when we were modelling the Asokan–Ginzboorg group
key agreement protocol, as it allowed us to create a general model for any group
size, [24]. However, for the Taghdiri-Jackson protocol, this was not so helpful.
Some information about the state of the system does not normally appear in the
trace. For example, when an agent leaves the group, the server generates a new
key, but this key does not appear in the trace. Additionally, our model follows
Paulson’s original design in that is does not include a ‘gets’ event to model message
reception, such as Bella later introduced to Paulson’s model, [5]. The only events
in the trace are ‘sent’ events, and in the presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker, these
messages may never be received by their intended recipients. This makes it hard to
work out who is legitimately in the group at a particular time, which is vital when
modelling the control conditions, i.e. tests that honest agents apply before sending
a protocol message. Even with a ‘gets’ event, a lot of digging through message
7
Steel, Bundy
trace would be required to determine group composition, and we would need to
do this almost every time an agent sent a message, creating an enormous search
problem. So, the model was changed to include some information about the state
of the principals. The unary function m() that was previously used to store just the
message trace is now an arity 4 function storing the trace, a counter, the current
group key stored by the server, and the composition of the group stored as a list
of triples. The triples store the agents name, the individual key which he shares
with the server for this session in the group, and the most recent group multicast
key he has received. We define a boolean function ingroup on these lists of triples
that determine whether or not a particular agent is in the group. A further change is
our modelling of freshness. We used to use the parts operator as used by Paulson,
but in our model for this protocol, we have a counter, and use this to model fresh
values. Our motivation for this was that so many fresh values have to be created
in a typical scenario, for individual keys, group keys and multicast messages, that
our checking of the parts literals would quickly slow down the search process.
We model multicast messages as hello(T ), where T is the counter value when the
message was sent, thus ensuring all (honestly sent) messages are unique.
Having chosen to use a counter-based model, we introduced a new pruning rule
to CORAL: if the counter variable occurs in term X inside an antecedent literal
ingroup(X ,Y ,Z ) = true , then the clause is redundant, since this would require
an agent at some point in the past to have joined the group and obtained a group
key or individual key that is only available now. A similar check is applied to
member(X ,Y ) = true literals. This eliminates a lot of unreachable states from
the search. This rule could be generally applied to backward searching tools using
a tick based model.
As an illustration, in Figure 1, we give the clauses required for modelling the
sub-protocol for the sending of multicast messages. Note that in a further change
from our original model used in [24], we record the composition of the group at
each point in time in the fourth argument of the sent constructor. This is important
for making conjectures about security properties later on. Note also that ingroup
is an arity 3 function, with the third argument returning the list of group members
without the agent named in the first argument. This is used when agents leave the
group or update their keys, as in the third clause in Figure 1. A further point to note
is that we still infer state information about principals from the trace, for example
to decide if they should be expecting a key update message in the third clause. Our
new model is something of a hybrid between a Paulson style trace model and a
state-based model like that used, for example, in [4].
3.2 Attacking the Protocol
In [22], Pereira and Quisquater attempt to lay down a list of desirable security
properties for group protocols. They define implicit key authentication, that an
outsider cannot learn the group key; two flavours of perfect forward secrecy, i.e.
that the compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys;
8
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%% SEND a message
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence,Tick)=true ∧
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Sq)),Group,Newgp)=true
→ m(cons(sent(Mi,server,encr(send(Sq),Ikey),Group),Trace),Group,
Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
%% server gives key
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence,Tick)=true ∧
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,Oldk),Group,Newgp)=true∧
member(sent(X,server,encr(send(Sq),Ikey),Tgroup),Trace)=true
→m(cons(sent(server,Mi,encr(pair(key(Keysequence),send(Sq)),Ikey),group),Trace),
Group,Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
%% agent broadcasts his message, updates his key
m(Trace,Group,Keysequence,Tick)=true ∧
ingroup(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,Oldk),Group,Newgp)=true∧
member(sent(X,Mi,encr(pair(key(Xk),send(Sq)),Ikey),Tg1),Trace)=true ∧
member(sent(Mi,server,encr(send(Sq),Ikey),Tg2),Trace)=true
→m(cons(sent(Mi,all,encr(hello(s(Tick)),key(Xk)),
cons(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Xk)),Newgp)),
Trace),cons(triple(principal(Mi),Ikey,key(Xk)),Newgp),Keysequence,s(Tick))=true
Fig. 1. Clauses for modelling the ‘send’ sub-protocol
and resistance to known-key attacks, i.e. that compromise of session keys does
not lead to the loss of future session keys. However, the properties Taghdiri and
Jackson found not to be satisfied by the original protocol design fall outside of
this categorisation. Essentially, this is because we are analysing a protocol for
managing a group key for an evolving group, not just establishing a key for a static
one.
The property vital to a key management protocol is that throughout the evo-
lution of the group, agents currently outside the group should not be accepted as
group members by the agents inside the group. We could perhaps call this multi-
cast group authenticity. For this protocol, this property has two flavours: the first,
which Taghdiri and Jackson call ‘outsider can’t read’, implies that no agent outside
the group should be able to read a message sent by a member of the group. The
second, which they call ‘outsider can’t send’, implies that members of the group
should not accept as valid a message sent from outside the group.
Posing security conjectures in an inductive formalism requires some thought.
We must translate an abstract idea of authenticity into a property expressed in terms
of messages in the trace. For group protocol properties, our trace includes the
composition of the group at each point, which becomes important now. For the
property ‘outsider can’t read’, we need to express the fact that when our dishonest
agent is indeed outside the group, and a message is sent by an honest player under a
key Gk , the spy does not know this key. So, we posed the property as a conjecture
to CORAL in this form:
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% For honest agent Mj
eqagent(Mj,spy)=false ∧
% There is a trace containing the sequence of
% messages for Mj broadcasting to the group under Gk
m(cons(sent(Mj,all,encr(hello(Y),Gk),Xgroup),
cons(sent(X,Mj,encr(pair(Gk,send(Sq2)),Ikey),Xgroup),
cons(sent(Mj,server,encr(send(Sq2),Ikey),Xgroup),
Trace))),Group,Keyseq,Tick)=true ∧
% and the spy is not in the group
ingroup(triple(principal(spy),X3,X2),Xgroup,Newgp)=false ∧
% but the spy has the key Gk
in(Gk,analz(Trace)=true →
This conjecture is negative, i.e. it states there should be no trace Trace ending with
the 3 messages specified in the first literal, with the spy outside the group, and with
the message hello(y) being sent under a key the spy knows (analz (X ) is the set of
terms the spy can learn from a trace X). The three final messages had to be specified
together because otherwise CORAL (correctly) finds a rather trivial attack where the
spy leaves the group between the server sending a key update out to Mj and Mj
broadcasting his message. Then he can read the message quite legitimately, since
he was in the group when it was sent. Given the above conjecture, CORAL gives
the counterexample in Figure 2. This is an attack on the protocol which hinges on
the spy sending a replayed key update message in message 13. Since the key may
or may not have changed since she last saw it, agent a will accept this key. The
problem is that there is minimal freshness information sent in the request for a key
(just the sequence number of the key an agent currently holds). Enclosing a fresh
nonce inside the package sent to the server requesting a key update would blunt this
attack.
Having discovered this attack, we realised that there is a similar one whereby
a spy can send a message from outside the group and have it accepted by an agent
inside the group, thus breaking the multicast group authenticity property, ‘outsider
can’t send’. We gave an appropriate conjecture to CORAL for confirmation, and it
discovered the counterexample in Figure 3. Like the previous attack, this is also a
replay attack, in this case with the spy replaying message 8 in message 13, tricking
agent a into thinking that message 11 came from a legitimate member of the group.
Replay attacks are in general more serious in the context of a group key manage-
ment protocol. A replay attack on a standard unicast protocol typically assumes
that it would be possible for a spy to obtain a short-term key by cryptanalysis or
some other means, and so it would constitute an attack on the protocol if he was
able to force an agent to accept an old key. In the two attacks above, no crypt-
analysis in necessary, since the spy can obtain some old keys by joining the group
legitimately, and then leave before effecting the attack. However, even if we as-
sume the spy does not have access to a valid long-term key, and so cannot join the
group, these replay attacks are still dangerous. If the spy obtains a short-term group
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1. spy → server : {| spy}| longtermK(spy)
2. server → spy : {| ik(1), Gk(1)}| longtermK(spy)
3. a → server : {| a}| longtermK(a)
4. server → a : {| ik(3), Gk(2)}| longtermK(a)
5. spy → server : {| send(1)}| ik(1)
6. server → spy : {| Gk(2), send(1)}| ik(1)
7. a → server : {| send(2)}| ik(3)
8. server → a : {| Gk(2), send(2)}| ik(3)
9. a → all : {| hello(9)}| Gk(2)
10. spy → server : {| leave}| ik(1)
11. server → spy : {| ackleave}| ik(1)
12. a → server : {| send(2)}| ik(3)
13. spy → a : {| Gk(2), send(2)}| ik(3)
14. a → all : {| hello(14)}| Gk(2)
Fig. 2. First attack on the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson Protocol
key by cryptanalysis, he can effect an attack without joining the group.
The second attack can also be prevented by adding a fresh nonce to the re-
quest for a key, this time for reading a message, and including it in the reply
from the server. A complete listing of the protocol model file is available at
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s9808756/tanaka-sato/.
4 The Iolus Protocol
The main difference between the Iolus protocol and the Taghdiri-Jackson version
of the Tanaka-Sato protocol is that Iolus eagerly distributes new keys, whereas
Tanaka-Sato distributes keys only on demand, i.e. as and when members of the
group want to send or read messages.
Joining the Group
1. Mi → S : {| join }| KMi
2. S → Mi : {| IkMi, Gkn′}| KMi
3. S → ALL : {| Gkn′}| Gkn
Members join the Iolus protocol in the same way as for Tanaka-Sato, i.e. by use of
a pairwise authentication protocol that we model with the use of a long-term key.
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1. a → server : {| a}| longtermK(a)
2. server → a : {| ik(1), Gk(1)}| longtermK(a)
3. spy → server : {| spy}| longtermK(spy)
4. server → spy : {| ik(3), Gk(2)}| longtermK(spy)
5. spy → server : {| read}| ik(3)
6. server → spy : {| Gk(2)}| ik(3)
7. a → server : {| read}| ik(1)
8. server → a : {| Gk(2)}| ik(1)
9. spy → server : {| leave}| ik(3)
10. server → spy : {| ackleave}| ik(3)
11. spy → all : {| hello(12)}| Gk(2)
12. a → server : {| read}| ik(1)
13. spy → a : {| Gk(2)}| ik(1)
Fig. 3. Second attack on the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson Protocol
The server generates a fresh individual key , IkM i, and a new group key with ID
n′, Gkn′ . In message 2, the group key is sent to the new member, and in message
3, it is sent to the old members of the group under the old group key, Gkn.
Leaving the Group
1. Mi → S : {| leave }| IkMi
2. S → ALL : [ {| Gkn′}| IkMj . . .] ∀j 6= i, Mj ∈group
When a member Mi leaves, a new key Gkn′ is generated, and sent to each member
in the form of a broadcast list. The list contains the new group key encrypted
under the pairwise session key of each member still in the group (the key cannot be
broadcast under the old group key, because this would give it away to the leaving
member).
Sending a message
1. Mi → ALL : {| message }| Gk(n)
The message is simply broadcast under the current group key.
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4.1 Modelling Iolus
No changes were required to the framework of the CORAL model to formalise
the Iolus protocol. Though the protocol distributes new keys eagerly rather than
lazily, the operations are similar to those used in the Tanaka-Sato protocol. The
most complex part of the model concerns the second message of the ‘leave’ sub
protocol. Here we must model the generation of an appropriate key update list for
an arbitrary group. This is a straightforward task in our first-order model. We define
a recursive function rekey that generates an appropriate rekeying message for a
given group and given fresh group key. This function works correctly in all modes
of instantiation, i.e. given a rekeying message it will return an appropriate group
and key. This is important in our backwards search process. The use of an auxiliary
rekey function is similar to our use of the all msg2s received function in
our model of the Asokan–Ginzboorg protocol, [24]. Being able to make these
kinds of recursive calculations seems (perhaps unsurprisingly) to be important in
modelling group protocols, and our first-order logic model is well suited to them.
4.2 Attacking Iolus
Having posed security conjectures for the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson protocol
above, formulating an appropriate conjecture for the Iolus protocol was easier.
Again, we are investigating multicast group authenticity, i.e. that those outside the
group cannot successfully impersonate those inside the group, either by sending or
receiving messages. However, since keys are supplied eagerly, we do not have the
same division of this property into ‘outside can’t read’ and ‘outsider can’t send’
conjectures. Instead we have to look at the possible ways keys can be updated. The
desirable property is: when a key update to key Gk is accepted by a member of a
group, and that group does not contain the spy, then the spy should not know the
key Gk . We formulate this property with respect to the updates sent after a group
member leaves like this:
% For honest agent Mj
eqagent(Mj,spy)=false ∧
% Mj accepts an update to key Gk
m(cons(sent(X,all,cons(encr(Gk,Ikey),Rest),
cons(triple(Mj,Ikey,OldGk),Restgp)),Trace),
Group,Xk,Tick)=true ∧
% the spy is not in the group
ingroup(triple(principal(spy),Y,Z),Restgp,Newgp)=false ∧
% but he knows the key
in(Gk,analz(Trace))=true →
Again this is a negative conjecture suggesting that for the protocol to be secure, no
trace should exist where the spy knows a key Gk accepted by group member Mj
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when the spy is outside the group. CORAL finds the counterexample in Figure4 4 .
Again this is a replay attack. In message 14, the spy replays a key update originally
sent in message 11, while he was still in the group. So, the spy knows the group key
Gk(4) even though he is no longer a group member. Note for this attack to work,
it is necessary for two honest agents to join the group as well as the spy, whereas
only one was required for the previous attacks, and note further that CORAL has
discovered this for itself - there is no pre-setting of the number of agents. Preventing
this attack is not as straightforward as it was for the Tanaka-Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson
protocol because the key updates are unsolicited, so there is no opportunity for
the agents and the server to exchange a nonce. The only way to protect against
replays would seem to be to include a timestamp inside the encrypted packages
sent in key updates, both when agents join and leave the group. This would require
all group members to have at least loosely synchronised clocks, and would further
require a decision in advance about the lifetime of group keys and the expected
amount of delay in the network. However, this limitation seems inescapable for
such protocols. In the presence of a Dolev-Yao spy it is insufficient, for example,
to include the last key in the key update message as freshness information, since
the spy may prevent this message from being received, and then re-send it once he
has left the group.
A complete listing of the Iolus protocol model file is available at
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s9808756/iolus/.
5 Lessons from the Case Studies
We have seen in these case studies the re-emergence in new protocols of oversights
made by the designers of the first security protocols. As we argued in §3.2, re-
play attacks like the ones we discovered are even more serious in the context of a
multicast key management protocol, and do not even require the spy to have full
Dolev-Yao capabilities - he need only be able to replay an old message, he does
not need to stop a message from being received or break messages apart. Our fix
for the Iolus protocol requires timestamps to be used in the protocol, which is not
wholly desirable, but seems the only solution for multicast protocols that eagerly
update keys. For on-demand rekeying such as is used in the Tanaka-Sato protocol,
a nonce exchange can be used.
In terms of automated group protocol analysis, we have seen that CORAL’s in-
ductive model, a first-order version of Paulson’s, is well suited to modelling group
key management protocols. The protocols involve an unbounded number of agents,
each of whom may play a role in different sub-protocols an unbounded number
of times. CORAL’s inductive model handles this naturally. Again we have seen
the value of a model that does not require us to pre-set the number of agents in-
volved in a group - only two agents were required for the attacks on the Tanaka-
4 In CORAL’s inductive model, we have an arbitrary and unbounded number of agents, so the first
agent is called a, the second s(a), and so on.
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1. a → server : {| a}| longtermK(a)
2. server → all : {| Gk(1)}| Gk(X8)
3. server → a : {| ik(2), Gk(1)}| longtermK(a)
4. spy → server : {| spy}| longtermK(spy)
5. server → all : {| Gk(2)}| Gk(1)
6. server → spy : {| ik(5), Gk(2)}| longtermK(spy)
7. s(a) → server : {| s(a)}| longtermK(s(a))
8. server → all : {| Gk(3)}| Gk(2)
9. server → s(a) : {| ik(8), Gk(3)}| longtermK(s(a))
10. a → server : {| leave}| ik(2)
11. server → all : [{| Gk(4)}| ik(8), {| Gk(4)}| ik(5)]
12. spy → server : {| leave}| ik(5)
13. server → all : [{| Gk(5)}| ik(8)]
14. spy → all : [{| Gk(4)}| ik(8), {| Gk(4)}| ik(5)]
Fig. 4. Attack on the Iolus Protocol
Sato/Taghdiri-Jackson protocol, but three are necessary for the Iolus protocol at-
tack. CORAL discovered this for itself.
There were two weaker aspects to CORAL’s performance: one was the diffi-
culty of posing conjectures. For the first case study, it took several attempts to
pose the security property in such a way that counterexamples really were attacks.
This is particularly annoying when it takes several hours to get the counterexample.
Some of the difficulty comes from the fact that is not trivial to translate the kinds
of authenticity properties required of unicast protocols to group protocol situations.
As we saw is §3.2, the properties outlined by Pereira and Quisquater for group key
establishment protocols are also unsuitable for a dynamic group situation. For ex-
ample, the property of perfect forward secrecy, where the compromise of long-term
secrets does not lead to the compromise of past sessions, does not hold for either
of the protocols analysed in this paper, since they both assume an authentication
protocol using long-term secrets is used to set up the pairwise keys for communi-
cation with the server. Compromise of these would lead to the compromise of all
session keys from the period when the compromised agent was in the group. The
Iolus protocol quite trivially does not satisfy the property of resistance to known
key attacks. New session keys are always distributed under old session keys, so
the compromise of one will lead to the loss of all subsequent keys. It is clear the
designers of these multicast key management protocols have not aimed to provide
these properties. Instead, we have identified multicast group authenticity as the key
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property, i.e. throughout the evolution of the group, keys used by group members
must be known only to other group members. This proves to be quite a tricky prop-
erty to express formally, and not just in CORAL, as we learnt from our experiments
with the AVISPA SATMC tool (see below). Having analysed the first protocol,
it was much easier to form the property required for the second. There has been
some work on automating the process of formulating conjectures in the inductive
model, [19], and this could perhaps be adapted to formulate properties for group
key management protocols.
The second weaker aspect of CORAL’s performance was the run times (up to 3.5
hours to find the second attack). This seems to be because the mixed trace based
and state based nature of the model led CORAL to explore a lot of unreachable
states. This we hope to address with a revised model storing more state information.
We are working on an interface to the intermediate format used in the AVISPA
project (see for example [4]). Thus we hope to take advantage of the efforts being
made to extend HLSPL to group protocols to facilitate further testing of CORAL.
With the help of L. Compagna, we have also been experimenting with one of the
current AVISPA back-ends, the SATMC tool, [1], to see if these protocols can
be modelled and the same attacks found. Some significant work will be needed
to model the protocols in a completely general way, without restrictions on the
number of agents and sub-protocol roles. Also, it seems that modelling key update
in the Iolus protocol will require the ability to reason explicitly about lists. We have
found that posing group security conjectures in the AVISPA intermediate format is
also difficult. In particular, it is not straightforward to express multicast group
authenticity. Not being able to reason about the order in which events took place,
and who was in the group at the time, further complicates the issue. However, with
appropriate extensions to the intermediate format and some more work, we expect
be able to rediscover the attacks in much faster times.
6 Conclusions
We were pleased with the way CORAL performed on these protocols. Firstly, the
use of an inductive model meant we didn’t have to make fundamental changes to
our modelling strategy to accommodate an open-ended protocol with an unbounded
number of agents, joins, leaves, messages sent and received etc. Secondly, mod-
elling at the first-order Horn clause level in a theorem prover meant making the
adaptations required to store and manipulate a list of current group members was
just an evening’s work. Thirdly, CORAL was able to discover attacks requiring a
long trace of messages to be sent, indicating it has scaled up well, despite exploring
a model without any pre-setting of the number of agents, joins and leaves etc.
There are dozens of protocols for this scenario in the literature, most of
which have received little or no formal attention. Our experience so far sug-
gests that they are likely to be vulnerable to attack. Since the field of standard
protocol analysis is already mature, this would seem to be a great opportunity
for the automated reasoning/formal methods community to solve an outstanding
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problem and prove the worth of their methods. Two pre-requisites for this are
the extension of protocol specification languages to group protocols, which is
already underway, and the establishment of a corpus of group protocols together
with attacks found or verification results achieved. This we are beginning to do: see
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/s9808756/group-protocol-corpus/.
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